The State of Utah v. John Orin Wulffenstein : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
The State of Utah v. John Orin Wulffenstein :
Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Dave B. Thompson; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for
Respondent.
Curtis C. Nesset; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assn.; Attorney for Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Wulffenstein, No. 919774.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3943
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
JOHN ORIN WULFFENSTEIN, 
Defendant/Appellant/ 
Petitioner 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Petition for reconsideration of a per curiam decision 
by the Utah Supreme Court filed February 6, 1986 in an appeal 
from a conviction and judgment of Aggravated Robbery, a felony 
of the First Degree, in the Second District Court, in and for 
Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge, 
presiding. 
CURTIS C. NESSET 
U Salt Lake Legal Defender Assn. 
C; 31T 333 South Second East 
l. Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
:.. _ Telephone: 532-5444 
Gt{Q-~L-~3-4: Attorney for Defendant/Appellant/ 
.-..•*-""-; JM'^ ^ Petitioner 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVE B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
FILED 
FEB Z 0 1986 
Ctet'k, Supreme Court, Utah 
Case No $ 1 9 774 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
JOHN ORIN WULFFENSTEIN, 
Defendant/Appellant/ 
Petitioner 
Case No. 19774 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Petition for reconsideration of a per curiam decision 
by the Utah Supreme Court filed February 6, 1986 in an appeal 
from a conviction and judgment of Aggravated Robbery, a felony 
of the First Degree, in the Second District Court, in and for 
Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge, 
presiding. 
CURTIS C. NESSET 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assn. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant/ 
Petitioner 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVE B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Table of Authorities ii 
Statement of the Case. . 1 
Statement of Facts 1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE APPELLANT WAS NOT REPRE-
SENTED BY AN ATTORNEY AT TWO 
CRITICAL STAGES OF THE PROCEED-
INGS AGAINST HIM AND DID NOT 
WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY . . 1 
POINT II: THE INTRODUCTION INTO EVIDENCE 
OF MISCELLANEOUS DRUGS WAS 






TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES CITED 
Carnley v. Cockran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) 3,4 
Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980) 4 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). . . . 4 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) 3 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-2 (1966) . . . . 4 
State v. Cook, 26 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (1986) 4 
State v. Wulffenstein, 27 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 
(Utah 1986) 1,6 
ii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
JOHN ORIN WULFFENSTEIN, 
Defendant/Appellant/ 
Petitioner 
Case No. 19774 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of a per curiam opinion, 
State v. Wulffenstein, 27 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (Utah 1986), filed by 
this Court on February 6, 1986. Originally, this case was an 
appeal from a conviction and judgment of Aggravated Robbery, a 
felony of the First Degree, against John Orin Wulffenstein in 
the Second District Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant 
(Appellant's Brief at 1-5). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT REPRESENTED BY 
AN ATTORNEY AT TWO CRITICAL STAGES 
OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM AND 
DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO AN 
ATTORNEY. 
!n its per curiam opinion, State v. Wulffenstein, 27 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 32 (1986), this Court has either misapprehended or 
overlooked a primary contention advanced by Appellant. 
The opinion correctly notes that Mr. Wulffenstein was 
not represented by an attorney at either the preliminary hearing 
in the circuit court or the arraignment in the district court* 
Id. at 33. Further, the opinion correctly states that Mr. 
Wulffenstenin was unrepresented at these proceedings because he 
had refused to be represented by the public defender's office. 
The opinion then rejects Appellant's contention that he should 
have been allowed to dismiss the court-appointed attorney and have 
another attorney appointed. However, the opinion next states, 
"The lower court properly advised defendant that his unjustified 
conclusory rejection of counsel would be deemed a waiver of the 
right to a court-appointed attorney." Id., at 33. 
In fact, no such mention of waiver of the right to counsel 
can be found in either the circuit court preliminary hearing trans-
cript (R.302-370) or the district court arraignment transcript 
(R.371-392). The closest that either court came to advising the 
defendant that his rejection of the public defender would be "deemed 
a waiver of the right to a court-appointed attorney" was a statement 
by the district court judge that: 
I'm willing to hear your reasons, 
if any, for refusing this office 
[the public defender]. Should you 
refuse this office for good reason, 
we will appoint someone else. If 
there is no good reason, then you 
will have to go alone without 
counsel. (R.375) 
-2-
This statement, however, falls far short of the advice required 
concerning waiver. 
Several cases have discussed waiver of the right to 
counsel and from these cases, it is possible to define the para-
meters of a constitutionally acceptable waiver. A finding of waiver 
is a requirement in right to counsel cases. The necessity of a 
finding that such a waiver has been made was decreed in Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Besides requiring that a waiver to 
right to counsel be "knowingly and intelligently" made, the Court 
in that case stated: 
It has been pointed out that 
"courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against waiver" of 
fundamental constitutional rights 
and that we "do not presume acquis-
cence in the loss of fundamental 
rights." . . . The constitutional 
right of an accused to be represen-
ed by counsel invokes, of itself, 
the protection of a trial court, in 
which the accused—whose life or 
liberty is at stake—is without 
counsel. This protecting duty 
imposes the serious and weighty 
responsibility upon the trial judge 
of determining whether there is an 
intelligent and competent waiver 
by the accused. While an accused may 
waive the right to counsel, whether 
there is a proper waiver should be 
clearly determined by the trial court, 
and it would be fitting and appropri-
ate for that determination to appear 
upon the record. Id. at 464, 465 
(emphasis added). 
In extending this protection to state criminal matters the Court 
in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) stated that the evidence 
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must show that the defendant was informed specifically of his 
right to the assistance of appointed or retained counsel and that 
he clearly rejected such assistance. No amount of circumstantial 
evidence that the person may have been aware of his right to 
counsel and intended to relinquish it will suffice. Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-2 (1966). 
Further, an adequate waiver of right to counsel which 
results in an accused representing himself has additional require-
ments. In those cases, the defendant "should be made aware of 
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the 
record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his 
choice is made with eyes open.1" Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806, 835 (1975). 
Finally, in Carnley v. Cochran, the Court stated: 
"Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The 
record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which 
show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and 
understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver." 
369 U.S. at 516. The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the position 
that waiver will not be presumed from a silent record when important 
constitutional rights are at stake. Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 
at 345 (Utah 1980) and State v. Cook, 26 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 at 22 
(1986) . 
To summarize, an adequate waiver of right to counsel 
requires that the waiver be knowingly and intelligently made 
on the record. An adequate waiver can only occur after a defendant 
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has been informed of his right to counsel and has been advised of 
the dangers and pitfalls of self-representation. Finally, waiver 
will not be presumed from a silent or inadequate record and every 
reasonable presumption against waiver must be indulged. 
Measured against this yardstick, the waiver in the 
present case was woefully inadequate. Neither the circuit court 
nor the district court investigated the concerns voiced by Mr. 
Wulffenstein about the public defender'.s off ice. Both courts 
seemed to proceed as if a waiver of right to counsel had been 
made by the Appellant, yet there is nothing in the record to show 
that the right was properly waived,if waived at all. In fact, 
near the conclusion of the district court arraignment, Mr. Wulffen-
stein specifically stated: "[I] would like to put on there [the 
record] that I have not waived any right to an attorney. . . " 
(R.387). No judge in any proceeding held in this case made a finding 
on the record to the contrary. 
POINT II 
THE INTRODUCTION INTO EVIDENCE OF 
MISCELLANEOUS DRUGS WAS HIGHLY 
PREJUDICIAL AND OF NO PROBATIVE 
VALUE. 
At trial, some bags containing loose drugs found in the 
possession of Mr. Wulffenstein at the time of his arrest were used 
by the prosecutor in questioning the pharmacist who was working 
at the time of the robbery (R.100-103). The bags of miscellaneous 
pills and capsules were introduced and received as exhibits A,C, 
and D. Mr. Wulffenstein objected to the use of the drugs at trial 
-5-
(R.103-04,221-22) and presented a claim of error concerning the 
drugs on appeal (Appellant's Brief at 10-14 and Appellantfs 
Brief at 7-11). This claim was rejected. State v. Wulffenstein, 
27 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 at 33-4 (1986). 
The per curiam opinion in this case stated: "The 
fact that every pill could not be positively identified as having 
come from the pharmacy does not make the evidence inadmissible." 
Id. at 34. This statement is erroneous since, in fact, not one 
of the pills or capsules could be positively identified as having 
come from the pharmacy (R.103-04). The trial judge in the case, 
agreeing with a defense objection, restricted the prosecution's 
use of the loose drugs to illustrate the type of pills taken in 
the robbery. (R.104). 
The opinion then engages in speculation concerning the 
probative nature of such evidence stating: 
Although circumstantial in nature, 
this evidence was certainly probative 
of defendant's guilt and was properly 
presented for the jury's consideration, 
even though possibly indicative of 
other misdeeds by defendant. Connection 
between the exhibits, the defendant, 
and the crime may be shown by the cir-
cumstantial nature of the evidence. 
The drugs were admissible to show the 
background and circumstances of 
defendant's involvement, particularly 
in light of the positive identification 
by the victims. 
Id. at 34 (citations omitted). In fact, although the exact basis 
on which the drugs were admitted is uncertain, the prosecution 
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sought admission solely for the fact that they were found on Mr. 
Wulffenstein (R.221-22). Since there was no way to tie any of 
these specific drugs to the robbery, the only possible purpose 
to be served by the admission of the drugs would be to present 
an image to the jury of the Appellant as a drug abuser and a menace 
to society. Thus, no legitimate purpose was served by the intro-
duction of the unidentifiable loose narcotics and the only result 
was to prejudice the Appellant. (Appellant's Brief at 10-14.) 
CONCLUSION 
Because the per curiam opinion in this case overlooked 
Appellant's contention that he did not waive his right to counsel 
and because the opinion misapprehended the limited use and prej-
udicial effect of the introduction at trial of exhibits A,C, and 
D, the Appellant respectfully petitions this Court to reconsider 
its decision and reverse his conviction and remand the case for 
a new trial or dismissal of the charges against him. 
Respectfully submitted this day of February, 1986. 
CURTIS C. NESSET 
Attorney for Petitioner 
I hereby certify that I delivered four copies of the 
foregoing to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol 
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